Guides10 min read

Domain Hijacking: How It Happens and How to Stop It

How domain hijacking works, which EPP statuses actually stop it, how 30 AI companies lock their domains, and what to do in the first hours after a hijack.

Domain record card showing EPP status locked: transfer, update and delete prohibited, with unlock verified by phone

Domain hijacking is the wrongful takeover of a domain name’s registration. The attacker gains control of the registrar account, changes the holder or moves the name to another registrar, then decides where it points. Unlike a changed DNS record, a stolen registration cannot be fixed by the holder alone.

A company domain carries the website, the email and every sign-in link, so losing it breaks all three at once. In July 2024, attackers took domains from at least a dozen organizations at a single registrar in four days. Yet our RDAP check of 30 AI company domains found that only 5 of 30 show the pattern of a registry lock, the one lock a stolen password cannot open.

What is domain hijacking?

Domain hijacking changes who controls a domain’s registration. DNS hijacking changes only where the name resolves, while the registration stays with its holder. In 2005, ICANN’s Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) defined domain hijacking as “the wrongful taking of control of a domain name from the rightful name holder.” The holder can restore DNS records alone, but a stolen registration needs a registrar, a dispute process or a court.

Four neighboring terms often get mixed up with it.

TermWhat changesWho or what is attackedHow it is undone
Domain hijackingHolder, registrar account or registrar of recordThe registrar account, registrar or registryRegistrar action, transfer dispute or court order
DNS hijackingDNS records (A, MX, NS); the registration staysDNS host or registrar credentialsRestore records, rotate credentials
DNS cache poisoningA forged answer in a resolver’s cacheRecursive resolvers and their usersFlush the cache; DNSSEC validation prevents it
CybersquattingNothing on your domain; a lookalike is registered in bad faithA trademarkUDRP complaint or court case
Reverse domain name hijackingNothing, unless the complaint succeedsA legitimate holder, via a bad-faith UDRP complaintPanel denies the complaint with a bad-faith finding

The last two rows are legal disputes, not intrusions. Under the UDRP Rules, reverse domain name hijacking means using the policy “in bad faith to attempt to deprive” a holder of a domain. Our guide to cybersquatting and UDRP complaints covers both sides of that process.

How domains get hijacked

Most domain hijacking starts with a person or an account, not with the DNS protocol. SSAC’s 2009 report SAC040 found that taking an organization’s entire domain portfolio needs only “a user account and password.” Five paths recur.

  • Registrar account takeover. Phishing or a reused password opens the account. SAC040 describes the Comcast incident of May 28, 2008: attackers entered Comcast’s Network Solutions account, which held about 200 domains, and changed the DNS for comcast.net.
  • Social engineering of registrar support. Attackers compromised Perl.com in September 2020, but nobody noticed until January 27, 2021. The suspected cause, unconfirmed by Network Solutions, was a social engineering attack with phony documents. The domain moved through BizCN and Key Systems before its recovery on February 5, 2021. In his account of the Perl.com hijacking, brian d foy wrote that two-factor authentication “probably would have saved us much of this trouble.”
  • A contact email on a lapsed or weak domain. Password resets go to the contact address. If that address sits on a domain that expires or is compromised, the attacker receives the reset.
  • Registrar, registry or DNS-provider compromise. In the Sea Turtle campaign, Cisco Talos reported on April 17, 2019, that attackers went after registrars and registries and compromised at least 40 organizations in 13 countries. Curve Finance lost about $570,000 after a DNS hijack on August 9, 2022. Curve suspected its registrar, iwantmyname, but the cause was never settled publicly.
  • Migration gaps. Squarespace agreed in June 2023 to take over about 10 million Google Domains names and migrated them over the following months. From July 9 to 12, 2024, attackers hijacked domains of at least a dozen organizations, mostly crypto firms such as Compound Finance and Celer Network. Researchers at MetaMask and Paradigm told KrebsOnSecurity that migrated accounts had no password and no MFA, so anyone with the contact email could claim them. Squarespace instead blamed “a weakness related to OAuth logins” and said the migration involved no changes to MFA.

Across 16 years of cases, the weakest point is whatever controls the account: a password, a support desk, an inbox or a migration default.

Domain lock vs registry lock: what each status blocks

A domain lock, also called a registrar lock, uses client statuses such as clientTransferProhibited. The registrar sets them, and anyone who gets into the registrar account can remove them. A registry lock uses server statuses, which registries set. According to ICANN’s EPP status code page, server codes “take precedence over client codes.” Removing a registry lock needs out-of-band verification, such as a phone call to a named person.

EPP statusSet byWhat it blocksHow it is removed
clientTransferProhibitedRegistrarTransfer to another registrarToggle in the registrar account
clientUpdateProhibitedRegistrarContact and name server updatesToggle in the registrar account
clientDeleteProhibitedRegistrarDeletionToggle in the registrar account
serverTransferProhibitedRegistryTransfer to another registrarRegistrar request plus out-of-band verification
serverUpdateProhibitedRegistryAny updateRegistrar request plus out-of-band verification
serverDeleteProhibitedRegistryDeletionRegistrar request plus out-of-band verification

The out-of-band step is the whole point. At Verisign, which runs .com and .net, an authorized registrar contact must take a phone call and give an individual security phrase. At Register.si, the registrar sends a written request and the registry confirms it by phone. Verisign counts a domain as registry-locked only when all three server statuses show.

A registrar lock stops casual and automated transfers. It does not stop an attacker who holds your password, because that attacker can switch it off in the same session. Before a legitimate move, our guide to transferring a domain between registrars explains when to lift each lock.

How many AI companies lock their domains

Only 5 of 30 leading AI company domains we checked show the pattern a registry lock leaves, although all 30 carry clientTransferProhibited, the standard registrar transfer lock. Those 5 carry all three server statuses: serverDeleteProhibited, serverTransferProhibited and serverUpdateProhibited. DNSSEC signing shows on 8 of 30. BuySI Domains ran the RDAP lookups on October 23, 2026, for domains from openai.com and anthropic.com to mistral.ai and elevenlabs.io.

Bar chart of 30 AI company domains: all 30 carry a registrar transfer lock, 8 are DNSSEC-signed and 5 show the registry lock pattern.
Every AI domain we checked has a registrar lock, but only 5 of 30 show the server statuses a registry lock leaves. Source: RDAP lookups by BuySI Domains, October 23, 2026.

The five domains with the full server pattern are openai.com, nvidia.com, x.ai, thinkingmachines.ai and elevenlabs.io. Of these five, only elevenlabs.io is also DNSSEC-signed. The other 25 of 30 show client-side statuses only, so their protection depends entirely on the registrar’s own account controls, with no registry-level check behind them.

RDAP does not label anything “registry lock”. Registries can set server statuses for other reasons, so we describe the five as consistent with a registry lock, not as confirmed. We queried the registry RDAP servers for .com, .ai, .io, .co, .inc and .company through the rdap.org bootstrap. Status records change, so a lookup on another day can differ.

Domain hijacking and .si domains

A .si domain is secured against hijacking differently from a .com, because it has no client transfer prohibited status. Instead, its registry, Register.si, relies on a holder-set password, holder consent and an optional Registry Lock. The .si extension is Slovenia’s country-code domain. For AI companies it reads as SuperIntelligence, which is our framing, not an official meaning.

Moving a .si domain to another registrar needs an authinfo password (geslo) that the holder sets, valid until first use or 16 days at most. A change of holder needs the consent of both the current and the future holder under Article 6.4.2 of the Register.si General Terms.

Register.si also offers Registry Lock for .si domains on the registrar’s request. A locked .si domain cannot be changed, transferred or deleted, but it can still be renewed. To lift the lock, the registrar sends a written request, and Register.si verifies it only during office hours, by calling the registrar’s appointed person. The registry charges registrars €20 excl. VAT for Registry Lock under the tariff in force since January 1, 2023, and registrars set their own end prices.

We ran the same RDAP check against Register.si on October 23, 2026. The .si names matching all 30 AI company names are registered, and none shows a transfer-prohibited status. That is expected: .si has no client transfer prohibited status, and only the registry sets the server one. Of 8 large Slovenian brand domains we checked, 1 shows the three server statuses that Register.si ties to locked domains.

A security brand such as kyberit.si, a name built for a cybersecurity company, is exactly the kind of name to put under Registry Lock after purchase. BuySI Domains lists kyberit.si for sale. Our guide to the .si domain covers the extension in more depth.

How to prevent domain hijacking

Preventing domain hijacking takes six steps: secure login, safe contact email, lock statuses, registry lock, DNSSEC and monitoring. Together they close the common attack paths of account takeover, support-desk fraud, a weak contact email, registrar compromise and migration gaps. The steps follow ICANN SSAC’s registrant guide SAC044 and CISA Emergency Directive 19-01. CISA issued the directive in January 2019 and has since closed it, but its four required actions remain a sound baseline.

Six-step diagram for preventing domain hijacking: secure login, safe email, lock statuses, a highlighted registry lock step, DNSSEC and monitoring.
Account controls come first, and registry lock is the one step an attacker with your password cannot undo. Source: ICANN SSAC SAC044; CISA Emergency Directive 19-01.
  1. Secure login. Use a hardware security key or an authenticator app for MFA at your registrar and DNS host. Give access only to people who need it.
  2. Safe email. Put the registrar contact address on a different domain, managed separately from the one it protects, as SAC044 advises. Otherwise one hijack hands the attacker the reset emails for the rest.
  3. Lock statuses. Keep transfer, update and delete locked at the registrar, and check the three client statuses after every change.
  4. Registry lock. For the domain you cannot lose, ask your registrar for the registry’s lock service. Talos recommended it after Sea Turtle. A stolen password cannot pass the registry’s phone check.
  5. DNSSEC. Sign the zone at your DNS host and publish the DS record through your registrar. Validating resolvers then reject forged answers, though DNSSEC cannot help once the registration is stolen.
  6. Monitor. Watch the RDAP record, DNS records and Certificate Transparency logs. CISA ED 19-01 told agencies to check those logs “for certificates issued that they did not request.”

Steps 1 to 3 cost nothing at most registrars. Step 4 costs a fee and slows legitimate changes, and Register.si says plainly that a locked domain is safer but much less flexible. For a core brand domain, that trade is usually worth it.

What to do if your domain is hijacked

If your domain is hijacked, contact your registrar first, then escalate. Every hour gives the attacker more time to move the name again or read mail sent to it.

  • Registrar and abuse contact. ICANN tells victims to “contact the registrar immediately for assistance.” Section 3.18 of the 2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement requires registrars to keep an abuse contact and to investigate reports promptly. They must also keep a separate law enforcement contact, monitored 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
  • Emergency contact. If the name has moved, your registrar can use the Transfer Emergency Action Contact (TEAC). Under the current ICANN Transfer Policy, the other registrar must respond within 4 hours. A revised policy adopted on June 7, 2026, would extend that window to 24 hours once implemented, but ICANN had set no effective date as of October 23, 2026.
  • ICANN complaint. You can file an Unauthorized Transfer Complaint, but “ICANN does not have contractual authority to require a registrar to transfer a domain name back.”
  • Transfer dispute. Only registrars can file under the Transfer Dispute Resolution Policy (TDRP), within 12 months of the alleged violation.
  • Courts and police. In Kremen v. Cohen (9th Cir. 2003), the court treated a domain name as intangible property and held that Network Solutions could be liable for handing sex.com to a forger.

For a .si domain, contact your registrar and Register.si at once. Under Article 6.4.3 of the Register.si General Terms, only a final court ruling or an ARDS decision can move a domain to a new holder against the current holder’s will. ARDS is the alternative dispute resolution procedure for .si.

Is domain hijacking illegal?

In many jurisdictions, prosecutors can charge domain hijacking under laws on theft, fraud or unauthorized computer access. In 2011, New Jersey sent Daniel Goncalves to state prison for five years for stealing P2P.com, on charges including theft by deception and computer theft. The state called it the first known conviction for domain name theft.

Which step to take first

A founder buying a premium name should move it into their own registrar account, then lock it the same day. Our guide to buying a domain that is already taken covers the purchase, and how EPP codes work covers the transfer. A company already on .ai or .com should check its RDAP record today. If only client statuses show, it sits with 25 of the 30 AI domains we checked, and a registry lock is the next request to its registrar.

Frequently asked questions

Is domain hijacking illegal?

Domain hijacking can be prosecuted as a crime in many jurisdictions, usually under laws on theft, fraud or unauthorized computer access. In New Jersey, Daniel Goncalves received five years in state prison in 2011 for stealing P2P.com, which the state called the first known conviction for domain name theft. US courts also treat a domain name as property: in Kremen v. Cohen (9th Cir. 2003), the court found an intangible property right in sex.com.

What should I do if my domain is hijacked?

If your domain is hijacked, contact your registrar immediately, because the 2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement requires registrars to keep an abuse contact and investigate reports promptly. If the name has moved to another registrar, your registrar can use the Transfer Emergency Action Contact (TEAC), which must respond within 4 hours under the current ICANN Transfer Policy. Only registrars can file a Transfer Dispute Resolution Policy complaint, within 12 months. For a .si domain, also contact Register.si.

What is the difference between DNS poisoning and domain hijacking?

DNS cache poisoning and domain hijacking attack different layers. DNS cache poisoning forges answers inside a resolver's cache, so users get a wrong address while the domain's registration and records stay untouched. Domain hijacking takes over the registration itself, usually through the registrar account. Flushing the resolver cache removes a poisoned answer, and DNSSEC validation stops forged answers for signed zones, while recovering a hijacked domain takes the registrar, a transfer dispute or a court.

How do I know if my domain has been hijacked?

Signs that a domain has been hijacked include a registrar account you can no longer log in to, changed contact details, new name servers, missing lock statuses in the RDAP record, or certificates you did not request in Certificate Transparency logs. Email that suddenly stops arriving is another early sign. Check the domain's RDAP and DNS records, then contact your registrar at once if anything changed without your approval.

What is reverse domain name hijacking?

Reverse domain name hijacking is the bad-faith use of a UDRP complaint to try to take a domain name from its legitimate holder. Under the UDRP Rules, a panel that finds a complaint was brought in bad faith, for example as an attempt at reverse domain name hijacking, must say so in its decision. Nothing changes at the registry: the complaint is denied and the finding is recorded.

Can a .si domain be hijacked?

A .si domain can be hijacked through the same weak point as any domain: the account or email that controls it. Register.si adds safeguards at the registry level. Moving a .si domain to another registrar needs a holder-set authinfo password valid until first use or 16 days at most, a holder change needs both holders' consent, and Registry Lock blocks changes until a written, phone-verified registrar request lifts it.

Sources

  1. EPP Status Codes: What Do They Mean, and Why Should I Know? — ICANN
  2. Transfer Policy — ICANN
  3. SAC044: A Registrant's Guide to Protecting Domain Name Registration Accounts — ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee
  4. Emergency Directive 19-01: Mitigate DNS Infrastructure Tampering — CISA
  5. DNS Hijacking Abuses Trust In Core Internet Service — Cisco Talos
  6. The Hijacking of Perl.com — Perl.com
  7. Researchers: Weak Security Defaults Enabled Squarespace Domains Hijacks — KrebsOnSecurity
  8. Updating information and Registry Lock — Register.si